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ABSTRACT 
It has been shown that armed conflict in Rwanda had a strong negative impact on schooling. 
Huge gaps remain, however, in our understanding of its heterogeneous effects across subgroups 
and the underlying mechanisms. Relying on population census data, we show that – in contrast to 
previous findings - there is no leveling off, i.e. the negative impact is not stronger for non-poor 
and boys. We further demonstrate that slower grade progression as well as increased drop-outs 
explain the drop in primary schooling, while the drop in secondary schooling is driven by a 
decline in school initiation. Finally, our results reveal a spatial mismatch between commune-
level genocide intensity and the drop in schooling. We test for several confounding factors - pre-
war regional trends in schooling, migration, selective killings, and post-war assistance to 
genocide survivors -  but find that none of these factors can fully account for the mismatch. We 
conjecture that the impact of armed conflict on schooling in Rwanda was nationwide, both 
because the disruption caused by the genocide was felt in every corner of the country and 
because - besides the genocide - other forms of violence took place in Rwanda in the nineties. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies have looked at the impact of armed conflict on schooling. Most of these studies 
provide evidence for a negative impact (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006; Akresh and de 
Walque, 2011; De Walque, 2004; Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Swee, 
2009; Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2009). A much smaller set of studies reports a positive impact 
(Arcand and Wouabe, 2009; Valente, 2011). So far, the channels underlying these contrasting 
findings are poorly understood, and appear highly context-dependent. For instance, Valente’s 
finding of a (small) positive effect on women’s education of the Nepalese civil conflict is 
explained in terms of the relative low intensity of the conflict as well as the strong position of the 
Maoist insurgence against gender-discriminating traditions. Arcand and Wouabe (2009) refer 
instead to the post-war labor market, characterized by a low wage for non-skilled labor and high 
expected returns to investment in education, to explain prolonged schooling of cohorts affected 
by the Angolan civil war. Justino et al. (2013) - finding the effect of conflict in Timor Leste to be 
negative for boys but not for girls - conjecture that boys may be sent to work to compensate for a 
conflict-induced adverse income shock. Akresh and de Walque (2011), presenting results 
indicating that the impact of the Rwandan genocide was more negative for boys, argue that this 
could be due to a leveling-off effect, i.e. a negative shock bringing everybody to a low level of 
schooling, and therefore affecting disproportionately boys, who previously had enjoyed an 
advantage in terms of education. In contrast, both Shemyakina (2011) and Chamarbagwala and 
Móran (2010) find girls to be disproportionately affected by exposure to the Tajik conflict and 
Guatemalan civil war, respectively, which – as argued by these authors – may be due to the 
higher post-war returns to education for boys.   
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Most channels mentioned in these studies can be understood as operating through supply 
or demand factors for education. Supply-related factors include the destruction of schools, the 
targeting of teachers and a decrease in the government budget for education. Demand-related 
factors are very diverse, including population displacement, youth enrollment in the military or 
rebel groups, limited mobility because of fear and insecurity, changes in family structures (e.g. 
orphanhood), reduced life expectancy (leading to lower expected returns on human capital 
investment), increased poverty (leading, among others, to more child labor), and health and 
nutritional channels (reducing school performance and attendance). Justino (2010) and Buvinic 
et al. (2013) provide an overview. Which supply- and demand factors operate and their relative 
importance, is highly dependent on the specific setting considered. First, conflicts differ in 
intensity, duration, geographic spread, and in the nature of the destruction - taking a large human 
toll or mostly destroying infrastructures. Second, the socioeconomic context plays a role, for 
instance in terms of child labor, household coping mechanisms and gender-discrimination. Third, 
post-war policies vary widely, depending on aid flows and the capacity and nature of the post-
war government in place.  
A very different, but equally important, set of reasons underlying the mixed evidence 
relates to the specification and data used in the empirical analysis. As such, results may depend 
on the exact empirical specification adopted by the researchers, as well as on the type and quality 
of the conflict intensity measures used in the analysis, which can range from proxies such as 
dwelling destroyed to more detailed data on the number of battle events and human rights 
violations. Furthermore, the household survey data used in the analysis may or may not be 
representative at the national level or – more commonly – may not be representative across a 
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number of characteristics, such as gender and separate income strata, or at the level of small 
administrative subunits.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the impact of armed conflict 
on schooling in Rwanda, a country located in Africa’s turbulent Great Lakes Region and 
characterized by a long and complex conflict cycle in the nineties, including civil war in 1990-92 
and 1994-98, the 1994 genocide, revenge killings, (counter-)insurgency operations in 1994-98 
and a massive refugee crisis, which overall caused an death toll of almost 1.000.000 individuals.
1
  
The first part of the paper builds on the widely cited study by Akresh and de Walque 
(2011) 
2
 - from now on referred to as AdW. In their study, AdW find that the Rwandan conflict 
caused an 18% drop in primary schooling, with the drop being stronger for boys and non-poor 
than for girls and poor. The authors attribute the drop in schooling to the genocide, by showing 
that the drop was more severe in regions where the genocide was more intense. We provide a 
replication of AdW, introducing three main changes to the analysis. First, we make use of a 
larger dataset. Whereas AdW rely on two waves of Demographic and Health household Surveys 
(DHS, 1992 and 2000), we make use of two waves of population census data (1991 and 2002). 
Both data sources bracket the main conflict events in Rwanda, but whereas the DHS is 
representative at the province level, the census data is representative for much smaller 
administrative units, for different income strata, age groups, and across gender. Secondly, we use 
                                                          
1
 It is estimated that the number of Tutsi killed during the genocide lies between 600,000 and 800,000, and that only 
25% to 30% of the Tutsi population survived the 1994 genocide (Prunier, 1998; Verpoorten, 2005). The genocide 
targeted also moderate Hutu and an unknown number of Hutu became victims of revenge killings, other forms of 
violence, or fell victim to diseases in refugee camps (Des Forges, 1999). It is likely that the total death toll of all 
events related to the conflict cycle in the nineties amounts to 1,000,000 (Verpoorten, 2012). Moroever, it is 
estimated that approximately 2 million people were displaced, and the transitional justice system for genocide 
suspects led to the imprisonment of more than 100,000 civilians. 
2
 According to Google Scholar, as of October 2013, the 2008 version of Akresh and de Walque’s working paper was 
cited 110 times. The paper exists as an IZA discussion paper (IZA DP No. 3516, 2008), a World Bank Policy 
Research Paper (WPS4606, 2008), and a Households in Conflict Network Paper (HiCN Working Paper 47, 2008). 
The version we refer to is the latest update that is available on the personal website of Richard Akresh, dated 
February 2011. 
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more detailed conflict measures defined at the level of 145 administrative communes instead of 
at the level of the 11 provinces. Finally, in contrast to AdW, we include all constitutive 
components of the interaction terms when studying the heterogeneous impact across gender and 
income. This is the correct way to proceed as argued among others by Brambor et al. (2006). Our 
results confirm the finding of a large drop in schooling, but not the results regarding the impact 
on poor versus non-poor, and girls versus boys. Also contrary to AdW, our results indicate that 
the drop in schooling cannot readily be attributed to the localized impact of the genocide.  
Besides this broad replication of AdW, we provide novel evidence on the impact of 
conflict on secondary schooling and on the relative importance of school initiation, grade 
progression and drop-outs. Finally, we investigate  the reasons underlying the spatial mismatch 
between commune-level genocide intensity and the drop in schooling. After demonstrating that a 
number of potentially confounding factors cannot fully account for the mismatch, we discuss the 
possibility that the impact of armed conflict on schooling in Rwanda was nationwide, both 
because the disruption caused by the genocide was felt in every corner of the country and 
because - besides the genocide - other forms of violence took place in Rwanda in the nineties. 
In sum, the contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, we show that by resorting to an 
improved empirical strategy and a more rich and representative dataset, our broad replication of 
AdW yield different and (we argue) more correct results. Second, the new results we provide are 
a contribution in itself, as they add to the growing body of literature that investigates the 
heterogeneous effect of armed conflict across gender and income strata. Third, thanks to the rich 
data at our disposal, we are able to study for the first time the different impact of conflict on 
primary versus secondary school, as well as the relative importance of school initiation, grade 
progression and drop-outs. Finally, we add to the existing literature on the Rwandan genocide, 
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by carefully investigating the relative importance of the localized effects of the genocide (versus 
nationwide effects) in explaining the decline in schooling.  
In the next section, we demonstrate the reliability of the Rwandan population census data, 
by showing that the census provides an exact match with population data from another source, 
and that the basic result of AdW - an 18% drop in primary schooling - can be replicated almost 
perfectly. In section 3 we study the sensitivity of this result across the choice of age groups and 
quantify the drop in secondary schooling. Section 4 looks at the variation of the schooling deficit 
across income and gender, providing evidence against the ‘leveling-off hypothesis’ put forward 
by AdW. Section 5 examines the relative role of school initiation, slow grade progression and 
dropouts. In section 6 we demonstrate that the spatial distribution of the drop in schooling cannot 
be attributed to the localized effects of the 1994 genocide. Section 7 and 8 investigate why this is 
the case. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The reliability of the Rwandan population census data and the 
replication of the basic result of AdW   
 
The DHS are firmly established in empirical research as a reliable source of information, mainly 
because of its standard and transparent approaches for data collection, cleaning and coding. In 
contrast, population census data do not enjoy a good reputation because the collection method 
and practice vary a lot across countries and census definitions of citizenship and ethnicity are 
often highly politicized. In the case of Rwanda, ethnicity is indeed politicized, which is reflected 
in the omission of ethnic identity in the 2002 population census, in line with the public rhetoric 
of national unity after the 1994 genocide. But, leaving ethnicity aside, the Rwandan census data 
turns out to be very reliable. Verpoorten (2005) compares the 1991 Rwandan census data with 
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1990 population data from the local administration of Gikongoro province and finds an almost 
exact match of the total number of women and men, which is indicative for the quality of both 
sources as they were collected independently of each other.
3
  
Another finding in support of the reliability of the Rwandan census data, is that - when 
repeating the basic empirical estimation of AdW with population census data instead of DHS 
data - we find a very similar estimate for the impact of conflict on schooling.  
AdW study years of education of a young (6-15) and an older (16-35) age cohort in the 
1992 and 2000 DHS survey, and conclude that children exposed to armed conflict completed 
close to one-half year less education, corresponding to a 18.3% drop relative to the average 
educational achievement. For the replication of AdW, we use the exact same empirical set-up, 
which consists of a difference-in-difference (DD) estimation of years of education, in which the 
identification of the conflict impact stems from exposure of the young age cohort in the 2000 
DHS to armed conflict at schooling age. The empirical equation for the DD estimate is: 
                                                          
3
 The 1991 national population census was collected in August 1991 by the national statistical office in collaboration 
with the UN, while the local population data used was last updated in December 1990 by the local administrative 
staff.  The local administrative staff recorded all births, deaths, immigrations and emigrations; and had to file reports 
on its population four times a year (Verpoorten, 2005). While the number of men and women is almost identical 
across both sources, the share of Tutsi in the population in the 1991 national census data is almost 40% lower than 
the share in the 1990 local population data. Since the local authorities had no reason to over-report the proportion of 
Tutsi in their population, and civilians themselves could not misreport to the local authorities as their ethnicity was 
known by their fellow community members, this indicates that the proportion of Tutsi in the national census was 
under-reported. 
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(Eq. 1) 
 
The summary statistics for the DHS variables are reported in Panel A of Table 1.  
---- Table 1 about here ---- 
Restricting observations to individuals aged 6 to 35, leaves 18,314 and 27,086 
observations for the 1992 and 2000 DHS, respectively. AdW find a DD estimator (α1) equal to    
-0.555; significant at the 1 percent level. In a narrow replication using DHS data, we find a very 
similar result, with a DD of -0.504. In a broad replication, relying on a 10% random draw of the 
1991 and 2002 censuses
4
 with observations on 441,870 and 465,156 individuals aged 6-35, we 
find a DD estimate of -0.584, corresponding to a 16.4% drop in years of schooling
5
 (the 
summary statistics for the census variables are reported in Panel B of Table 1). This estimate is 
very close to the AdW result, despite slightly different sample years: 1992 and 2000 for the DHS 
versus 1991 and 2002 for the census data. Table 2 gives an overview of these results. 
---- Table 2 about here ---- 
                                                          
4
 The 10% draw of the 1991 census is made available by Minnesota Population Center (2010). The same source also 
provides access to a 10% draw of the 2002 census, but this sample does not include the names of the administrative 
sectors. We therefore take a new 10% random draw directly from the full 2002 census. Results remain qualitatively 
the same when considering the full census.  
5
 The proportional change in schooling is derived as the DD estimate when the dependent variable equals the natural 
logarithm of years of schooling.  
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In a next step, we follow AdW by expanding Eq.1 to include household level controls X 
as well as province and age fixed effects: 
 
(Eq. 2) 
 
We take care to include the same household level controls as AdW: an indicator variable for 
female, for non-poor households
6
, the age of the household head, the highest education level of 
any household member, the number of children under 5, and an indicator variable for rural areas. 
The DD estimate of the augmented empirical equation reported by AdW is -0.421***. In our 
narrow replication using DHS data we find again a similar estimated coefficient of                  -
0.494***. The broad replication using census data yields an estimate of -0.660***. In 
proportional terms, this latter figure amounts to a drop of 18.6%, which matches almost perfectly 
the 18.3% estimate of AdW.  
In sum, the analysis presented in this section confirms the main result of AdW of a large 
drop in schooling and demonstrates that the DD estimates are very similar across the DHS and 
census data. In addition, the coefficients on the control variables X are also similar. This is an 
indication for the reliability of the census data and lends support to their use in our exploration of 
the channels that account for the schooling deficit. 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The indicator variable non-poor indicates if the individual has more assets than the population mean. The assets 
include piped running water, refrigerator, radio, finished floor, bicycle, motorcycle, and car (AdW, 2011).  
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3. Alternative age cohorts and the drop in secondary schooling 
 
Before we start investigating the channels underlying the drop in schooling, we repeat the basic 
analysis with different choices of age groups. We do so for two reasons: first, to demonstrate the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative cut-off ages; and second, to inform about the impacts on 
secondary schooling. 
Above, we have taken the age group 16-35 as a control group for studying the impact of 
conflict on the young cohort, 6-15. Doing so, we follow the baseline specification of AdW 
7
, but 
strictly speaking, the age groups used in our broad replication are not a one-to-one match with 
those of AdW. One could argue that a closer match to the age cohort used in AdW is the age 
cohort 8-37 in the 2002 census, since individuals aged 8-37 in 2002 were aged 6-35 in 2000, the 
DHS survey year. Therefore, we repeat our broad replication of AdW using the age cohort 8-17 
as the young cohort and 18-37 as the old cohort. The results, shown in Table 3, are qualitatively 
the same, but quantitatively larger, with a DD estimate of -0.931*** for Eq. 1, corresponding to 
a 21.3% drop in years of schooling.  
---- Table 3 about here ---- 
The old age groups (16-35, 18-37) used so far as control groups include individuals that 
were at schooling age when the genocide broke out. For instance, individuals aged 16 to 22 in 
2002 were aged 8 to 14 in 1994. At that age, many were still attending primary school
8
, and their 
schooling attainment may thus have been affected by the conflict. This is confirmed by Figure 1 
which shows that years of schooling in 2002 is lower than in 1991 for individuals up to 22 years 
                                                          
7
 In a number of robustness checks AdW find similar results when using alternative cutoff ages for the young and 
old cohorts. In their robustness checks, they define the young cohort as aged 6 to 12, 6 to 18, 6 to 21, and 6 to 24; 
and the old cohort as aged 16 to 25, 16 to 30, 16 to 40, 16 to 45, 16 to 50, and 16 to 55. 
8
 According to the 1991 census, 39% of the children aged 8 to 14 are enrolled in school, with 78% of them being 
enrolled in primary school. 
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old. In Column (2) of Table 3 we therefore repeat our estimation using the expanded young age 
cohort (6-22). We find a drop in years of schooling of -1.189***, corresponding to a proportional 
decrease of 25.0%. 
---- Figure 1 about here ---- 
This result suggests that, besides affecting primary schooling, the conflict may have 
affected secondary schooling. To study the impact on secondary schooling, we compare the age 
group 14-22, which in 1991 represented 73% of the student population enrolled in secondary 
schooling
9
, with the age group 23-35. We find a DD estimate of -1.083***, representing a 
decrease of 17.6% of secondary schooling years.  
In sum, this section indicates that the overall drop in schooling estimated using the census 
data varies between 18.6% and 25.0% depending on the choice of the age groups. The age cohort 
16-35 may not be the best choice as a control group because it includes individuals who were at 
primary schooling age at the time of the armed conflict. Even if the control group would be 
restricted to individuals aged above primary schooling age, the impact of schooling may still be 
underestimated, as secondary schooling was also affected by armed conflict. Despite the caveats 
of the age groups 6-15 and 16-35 we use these groups in our baseline results below so to allow 
direct comparison with AdW. Given this choice, our estimated effect of conflict on schooling 
attainments should be considered as a lower bound. We also re-run all our regressions using the 
cohorts 8-17 and 6-22 as young age cohorts. All our results remain in a qualitative sense. 
 
  
                                                          
9
 Like most African countries, Rwanda is characterized by large variations in the age of the students attending the 
same class, which complicates the demarcation of secondary schooling age. In 1991,  96% of students enrolled in 
secondary school were between 12 and 22 years, but the majority of those  aged  12 and 13 were still in primary. 
This is why we set the cutoff age at 14. 
12 
 
4. Leveling-off versus no leveling-off 
 
(a) Non-poor versus poor 
 
AdW set out to evaluate whether conflict affects years of education differently across the poor 
and non-poor in the DHS samples. For this purpose, they add a three-way interaction term to Eq. 
2, in which the treated group (young age cohort in the 2000 DHS) is interacted with a household-
level indicator variable for being non-poor (non-poor*young*T). However, their approach has 
two main limitations.  
First of all, AdW do not include the constitutive components of the interaction term, i.e. 
they do not include the terms non-poor*young and non-poor*T. As pointed out by Brambor et al. 
(2006), the omission of constitutive components of interaction terms may severely bias the 
estimates. The authors find a large negative DDD estimate of -1.223*** on their three-way 
interaction term, and conclude that “Somewhat surprisingly, it is among the children in non-poor 
households in which the negative shock is strongest.” (p. 12). We can replicate this result almost 
exactly using the DHS data, provided that we omit the constitutive terms non-poor*young and 
non-poor*T (not reported). When including these terms, however, we obtain an estimated 
coefficient of -0.399***, indicating a much smaller additional negative impact on schooling for 
the non-poor. When we perform the broad replication using the census data, the estimated DDD 
coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero, at 0.013. These results are reported in 
Table 4.  
---- Table 4 about here ---- 
Even when including the constitutive terms, however, estimates may be biased due to 
several confounding factors. For instance, poverty may itself be a determinant of conflict 
intensity, or the non-poor may be characterized by different trends in pre-war schooling. To 
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solve for the confounding factors, one would need to include a rich set of control variables 
and/or properly instrument for conflict intensity, requiring rich data and/or a valid instrument - 
both of which are in short supply. We will therefore not be able to provide a clear answer to 
whether conflicts disproportionately affected poor households in terms of years of education. 
What we can do is highlight the importance of confounding factors and the need to 
qualify the results. Take for instance the different trends in schooling across urban and rural 
households, shown in Figure 2.  
---- Figure 2 about here ---- 
Since the urban areas are home to many of the non-poor, these different trends are associated 
with different trends across poor and non-poor; using the measure of poverty as presented by 
AdW, 42% of the people living in rural areas were non-poor in 1991, compared to 81% of the 
people living in urban areas. When we run our regression including an indicator variable for 
urban communes
10
 and the full set of interaction terms urban*T, urban*young and 
urban*young*T, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term poor*young*T, albeit of small 
magnitude, turns positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that, if anything, conflict 
has a stronger negative effect on poor households.  
In sum, the result of AdW of a higher schooling deficit for non-poor fades away when 
adding the constitutive components of the interaction terms and is reverted when accounting for 
part of the non-randomness of poverty by including a set of urban time trends and interaction 
terms. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 The urban indicator variable takes the value one for the communes of Kigali City, the provincial capitals and a 
number of other secondary urban centers. 
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(b) Boys versus girls 
Conflict cannot turn boys into girls, or girls into boys; and sex is not clustered in space. This 
makes it relatively easy to study the heterogeneous impact of conflict across boys and girls, as 
the three-way interaction term female*young*T can be interpreted unambiguously.  
AdW add this term to Eq. 2 and report a positive DDD estimate of 0.219***, suggesting that 
the impact of the conflict on the schooling of girls is less negative than the impact for boys. This 
points to a leveling off effect: “A potential reason might be that female schooling outcomes were 
lower initially, and so they had less to lose after the genocide” (AdW, p.12).  
---- Table 5 ---- 
However, also in this case, two out of the three constitutive terms of the interaction effect are 
erroneously omitted (female*young and female*T). In a narrow replication on the basis of DHS 
data and omitting the constitutive terms of the DDD we also find a positive coefficient 
(0.148***, not reported). In a correct specification we find instead an estimated coefficient of  -
0.039 and, when using the census data, we obtain a negative coefficient that is significantly 
different from zero, -0.162***, pointing to an additional schooling deficit for girls. These results 
are reported in Table 5. When running the regressions on subsamples, for boys and girls 
separately, we find a DD estimate of -0.596*** for boys and -0.727*** for girls; indicating that 
the conflict led to a drop in schooling of 15.7% for boys, compared to a drop of 21.3% for girls 
(not reported in the Table). The result is robust to changes in the age thresholds considered: the 
coefficient of the DDD term remains negative and significant at 1% when we compare the cohort 
8-17 to 18-37 (-0.130***, not reported) and 6-15 to 23-35 (-0.126***, not reported). When 
comparing the cohorts 6-22 to 23-35 the estimated coefficient weakens to -0.079**, and 
significance disappears when we focus only on secondary schooling, comparing cohort 14-22 to 
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23-35 (coefficient -0.43). These results suggest that the negative effect was stronger for girls at 
primary schooling age, but not for girls at secondary schooling age, which is also confirmed by 
Figure A1, in which we report the estimated DDD coefficient for each age, from 6 to 20. 
As the DDD estimate is unlikely to be affected by confounding factors, it should remain 
stable when adding the urban factors (urban*T, urban*young and urban*young*T). We indeed 
find that when adding these terms, the estimated DDD coefficient only changes marginally from 
-0.162*** to -0.172***.  
In sum, the result of AdW of a higher schooling deficit for boys is reverted when adding the 
constitutive components of the interaction terms. Our findings point to an additional negative 
conflict impact on the schooling of girls, and especially so for girls at primary schooling age. 
 
5. School initiation, drop-out or slow grade progression?  
The drop in schooling can be due to (H1) children who do not initiate school, (H2) children who 
drop out of school, or (H3) children who slowly progress through grades. AdW investigate the 
role of school initiation (H1) by studying grade completion separately for grades 1 to 6. They 
find that, first-grade completion is very similar across 1992 and 2000  and conclude that “the 
schooling deficit of the cohorts who were of schooling age after 1994 is not so much due to a 
lack of access to education, since the differences for the first grade are minimal, but rather to 
difficulties to progress through the grades or continue attending school.” (p. 7-8).  
AdW do not investigate the relative importance of (H2) dropouts and (H3) repetition.
11
 
We can shed more light on this because the 1991 and 2002 censuses contain information on the 
                                                          
11
 On page 14, AdW write that: “… with the available data, it is not possible to determine definitively if this impact 
of genocide on grade progression is due to children repeating grades or dropping out of school after the first few 
grades.” 
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past and present schooling status of the individuals in the sample. More specifically, for each 
person we know whether he or she has ever attended school and whether he or she still is a 
student.
12
 Using these two pieces of information, we construct the variables everbeentoschool 
and student.  
We first produce a set of simple figures. Figure 3a displays the shares of individuals who 
ever attended school by age and year. Comparing these shares across 1991 and 2002, it is clear 
that, in 2002,individuals across all ages of the age group 6-35 were more likely to have ever 
attended school, which supports the finding of AdW that school initiation (H1) is not a major 
issue.  
Figure 3b displays the share of individuals aged 12 or above that completed primary 
school, among the population that is no longer in school but that has attended school in the past. 
The figure shows that, in the census year after the conflict, more students dropped out before 
completing primary education, providing support for (H2).  
Finally, if slow grade progression (H3) is among the causes of the observed drop in 
schooling, we should find that students in 2002 are older than students in 1991, conditional on 
the grade they attend. This is shown in Figure 3c, which gives the average age of students across 
twelve different grades. The average age of students is higher in 2002 than in 1991 for each of 
the six primary grades (1-6) and across the three years of lower secondary schooling (7-9), but 
not for upper secondary schooling (grades 10-12). For instance, students who attend the final 
grade of primary school are on average 15.9 years old in 2002 compared to 13.4 in 1991.  
                                                          
12
 More precisely, census data only records the years of schooling completed by each individual. We therefore 
approximate the fact of ever attending school with the completion of the first year of primary school. Also, the 
student/non student status is available only for individuals aged 10 or above in the 1991 census. 
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Combined, these figures suggest that drop-outs (H2) as well as grade repetition (H3) are 
driving the result of a decrease in primary schooling, while school initiation (H1) is not a major 
issue. 
---- Figure 3 about here ---- 
We study this more formally. First, focusing on school initiation (H1), we repeat the 
estimation of Eq. 2 when replacing years of schooling by everbeentoschool as a dependent 
variable.
13
 Column (1) of Table 6a shows that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
young*T is not significantly different from zero, at -0.007, indicating that the young cohort in 
2002 was not less likely to have completed at least one year of school (compared to the older 
cohort in 2002 and relative to the difference between the young and old cohort in 1991).  
To study whether dropouts (H2) played a role, we take primary school completion as our 
dependent variable. Focusing on those individuals that ever attended school but are no longer 
enrolled in primary school, we redefine the young cohort as those aged 14 to 22 and the old 
cohort as those aged 23-35.
14
 Estimates reported in Column (2) of Table 6a show that in 2002, 
students in this young age cohort were 28.5% less likely to have completed primary school 
compared to the young cohort in 1991.  
---- Table 6 about here ---- 
 To study the case of slow progress (H3), we restrict our analysis to individuals enrolled 
in grades 1-6, and to the age group 10-18 because information on student status is available only 
                                                          
13
 Although this variable is binary, we keep the linear estimation model, because it is more traceable and any 
possible bias will be small given the large number of observations. Results are in any case all confirmed when using 
a Probit model. 
14
 According to the 1991 census, 93% of the students enrolled in primary school were younger than 14. Results are 
in any case very robust to small changes in the definition of the cohorts. 
18 
 
from age 10 onwards, and because above age 18 there are very few primary school students
15
. 
We introduce an individual’s age as the dependent variable in the following equation: 
 
(Eq. 3) 
The coefficient of interest is β1. It indicates whether, for a given grade, students are on average 
older in the post-war population than in the pre-war population. The estimate for β1, 1.708***, 
provides clear evidence for slow grade progression. On average students in 2002 were over one 
and a half years older than students in the same grade in 1991.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for secondary schooling. In sharp contrast to 
primary schooling, but in line with the patterns in Figures 3abc, the results indicate that school 
initiation is the most salient factor explaining the drop in secondary schooling.
16
 In Column (1) 
only individuals that completed primary school are considered. The coefficient indicates that in 
2002, individuals in the age cohort 14-22
17
 were 40% less likely to complete the first year of 
secondary school compared to the same cohort in 1991 and relative to the difference between 
that cohort and the old one in the census rounds. On a positive note, results in the second column 
indicate that those who started secondary schooling were not less likely to finish it (if anything, 
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 According to the census rounds, the share of individuals over 18 attending primary school is less than 0.5% in 
1991 and less than 2% in 2002. Once again, results are very robust to small changes in the age thresholds. 
16
 As the census only records the years of schooling completed by each individual, also in this case we approximate 
enrolment in secondary school with the completion of the first year of secondary school. 
17
 See Section 3 for a justification of the choice of the 14-22 age category.  
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they were more likely to do so), and this despite evidence for a slightly slower grade progression 
(last column)
18
.  
In order to test whether these effects are the same for boys and girls, we add to our 
regression the interactions with the female dummy. Results reported in Table A1 in Appendix 
reveal a heterogeneous impact of conflict on school initiation, dropouts and grade progression 
across gender However, the differences are generally small and our previous conclusions on the 
relative importance of the three factors hold for both boys and girls. The most significant 
difference concerns the increase in dropouts from primary school, which is estimated to be about 
50% higher for girls than for boys. The difference in primary school enrolment is also significant 
and reveals a somewhat negative effect for girls, but not for boys; even if the effects are 
quantitatively small. 
 
6. Attribution to genocide: contrasting findings 
Among the events in Rwanda’s conflict cycle of the nineties - civil war, genocide, revenge 
killings, (counter-)insurgency operations and a massive refugee crisis - the genocide stood out 
with a death toll of close to 800,000 in barely 100 days, between April and July 1994. AdW test 
whether the drop in schooling can be attributed to the genocide by estimating a difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DDD) model in which the treatment group (young age cohort in the 
post-war round) is interacted with a measure of genocide intensity. In other words, they augment 
Eq.2 with the term T*young*genocide_intensity as well as all its constitutive components.  
                                                          
18
 The choice of the lower limit of 18 is based on the fact that according to both the 1991 and 2002 census virtually 
nobody completed secondary schooling before that age. The choice of the upper limit of 26 is instead more arbitrary. 
In any case, less than 0.5% of individuals enrolled in secondary school in 1991 were above 26. Results are very 
robust to small changes in the definition of the upper limit. 
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AdW consider three different genocide intensity measures: the proportion of days during 
which killings occurred in a province in the months April-June 1994 (Measure A), an indicator 
variable taking one for the three provinces with the highest number of killings in 1994 (Measure 
B), and the number of mass graves and memorials per province (Measure C)
19
. The DDD 
estimates obtained by AdW – reported in Panel A of Table 7 - are all negative and significant at 
the 10% level (A:-0.024*, B:-0.329*, C:-0.023*), pointing to a significantly stronger negative 
impact on schooling in provinces where the genocide intensity was higher.  
We cannot replicate these results. As Panel B of Table 7 shows, in our narrow replication, 
using the same data, variables and specification, we obtain very different coefficients: 
A:0.744**, B:-0.892*** and C:0.005. It is not clear what accounts for these differences
20
. 
Estimates are also very different when we estimate the DDD model using the population census 
data; the coefficients - reported in Panel C of Table 7 - are all close to zero (A:0.003**, B:0.094, 
C:0.001).  
---- Table 7 about here ---- 
In an attempt to address the potential endogeneity of genocide intensity, AdW perform an 
IV estimation. Using the province-level distance to the Ugandan border as an instrument, AdW 
report IV coefficients that are in line with their OLS results. Once again, we obtain very different 
results – mostly not statistically significant - both in our narrow and for our broad replication21.  
                                                          
19
 Measure A and B are taken from the genodynamics project (Davenport and Stam, 2009); measure C is taken from 
the Yale Genocide Studies website (http://www.yale.edu/gsp/rwanda/) 
20
 Dropping the province fixed effects, or the constitutive components - one by one and in pairs – does not bring the 
replication results closer to the results presented by AdW. 
21
 Results are available on request. We do not discuss them in detail because the exclusion restriction is in any case 
unlikely to hold. To defend the choice for the instrument, the authors argue that "Provinces close to the Ugandan 
border were reached faster by the RPF who stopped the killings perpetrated by the Interhamwe militia, and 
therefore these provinces are more likely to be low war intensity provinces" (p.11). Although this instrument is 
relevant, i.e. it is sufficiently correlated with 1994 killings, it is unlikely to be exogenous, as the Southern part of the 
 
21 
 
Leaving aside the comparison with the results of AdW, our failure to establish a direct 
link between the drop in schooling and the genocide may be due to the fact that the conflict 
intensity measures considered so far are all defined at the province level and may be too crude to 
properly capture variation in genocide intensity. We address this issue by turning to four finer 
measures, defined at the level of the 145 administrative communes: the proportion of Tutsi in the 
pre-war population, the share of genocide suspects, the number of mass graves, and the distance 
to the nearest mass grave calculated from the commune centroid.
22
 Table 8 reports the estimates: 
none of the measures yields a DDD that is significantly different from zero and of the expected 
negative sign.
23
  
In sum, the DDD model does not attribute the observed drop in schooling to the 
genocide, even when using finer genocide intensity measure and a larger and more representative 
dataset.  
---- Table 8 about here ---- 
 
7. Why can’t we attribute the drop in schooling to genocide? 
We investigate the possibility that the attribution of the drop in schooling to the genocide (the 
DDD estimate) is confounded by pre-war regional trends, migration, selective killings, or post-
war assistance to genocide survivors. For ease of exposition, we only discuss results in which we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
country was also characterized by a higher concentration of Tutsi, which traditionally enjoyed higher levels of 
education (see also our discussion in Section 7). 
22
 The first of these measures is calculated from the 1991 Rwandan population census, the second from the records 
of the Gacaca (the transitional justice system for genocide suspects), and the latter two from a map taken from the 
Yale Genocide Studies website. 
23
 To investigate whether endogeneity might be biasing these estimates, we repeat the regression instrumenting the 
conflict variables (and their interactions) with the commune-level (log) distance to the border with Uganda, 
following the approach suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.236). The qualitative results remain the same (not 
reported). Finally, we repeat the regression including commune fixed effects to limit the likelihood of bias stemming 
from omitted time-invariant factors, and find again similar results (not reported). 
22 
 
consider the share of Tutsi living in the commune in 1991 as the proxy for genocide intensity, 
but results are similar whenever one of the alternative proxies is considered (not reported, but 
available on request). 
 
(a) Pre-war regional time trends in schooling  
The DDD takes the pre-war population as a control group, implicitly assuming that conflict 
intensity does not relate to pre-war trends in schooling. This assumption is violated if both 
conflict and schooling trends are affected by an unobserved common factor. One such factor may 
be the identity of the political leader
24
. In Rwanda, prior to independence, the Tutsi monarchy 
was dominating and the areas around the capital of the Tutsi monarchy (‘Nyanza’, located on the 
intersection of Gitarama and Butare) were flourishing. The ethnicity of the leader changed from 
Tutsi to Hutu in 1959, and discrimination against Tutsi increased, especially during the 
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994) when favors were directed to the core of Habyarimana’s 
supporters, residing in the provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, in the Northwest of the country 
(Des Forges, 1999).
25
 
Clientelism and switching powers may therefore account for pre-war differences in 
schooling trends across the country.
26
 To check whether these pre-war trends are confounding 
our DDD results, we add a complete set of province trends and province interaction terms to the 
                                                          
24
 Kudamatsu (2009) and Franck and Rainer (2012), among others, show that there is a strong link between the 
identity of political leaders and the development of the regions that are favored by them. 
25
 About Habyarimana’s political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Dévelopment (MRND) 
Des Forges (1999, p.45) writes: “…the MRND had regulated access to government-supported high schools, 
supposedly assigning places according to quotas for ethnic and regional groups. The quotas were both inaccurately 
computed and unfairly applied, favoring children from the Northwest or those whose families could pay in money or 
other benefits for access to education.” 
26
 Figure A2 in Appendix shows that whereas individuals in the old age cohort in Butare and Gitarama had higher 
schooling in 1991 than their counterparts in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, the difference is minimal for the young cohort 
in 1991. This pattern is consistent with a catch-up of schooling in the stronghold of Habyarimana regime. The 
pattern remains even when removing Tutsi from the sample, suggesting that - besides ethnicity - regionalism played 
a role. 
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DDD regression model (i.province*young*postwar, i.province*young, i.province*postwar). 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results: the DDD estimate remains statistically indistinguishable 
from zero.  
 
(b) Nonrandom displacement  
The aftermath of the genocide was characterized by a huge refugee crisis. An estimated two 
million Rwandans were displaced in 1994, with the majority of them resettling only in the period 
1996-98 (Des Forges, 1999). If especially highly educated adults moved out of the most affected 
communes, the gap between the young and old cohort remaining in those communes would 
appear smaller than what would have been otherwise, thus biasing our DDD estimate towards 
zero.
27
 
The census data include information on place of birth, previous residence, current 
residence and time at current residence, allowing us to trace an individual’s migration history. To 
gauge whether migration is causing a bias we assign all individuals who moved between 1994 
and 2002 to their previous commune of residence and we re-estimate the DDD model.
28
 The 
results, reported in Panel B of Table 9, show that the DDD coefficient remains statistically 
insignificant.
29
 
                                                          
27
 Figure A3 in Appendix shows that adults who migrated between 1994 and 2002 had on average higher levels of 
education compared to non-migrants. 
28
 In 2001 Rwanda underwent a large administrative reform that transformed its 145 communes into 106 districts. 
The 2002 census only provides previous district of residence. For those districts that overlap with different 
communes we arbitrarily assign the individual to one of the communes. Results are robust to dropping these 
observations and only re-assigning individuals that migrated from one of the 20 districts perfectly matching previous 
communes. 
29
 We cannot account for individuals who left Rwanda after the genocide and did not return, as they are not included 
in the 2002 census. Again, if especially well educated adults left heavily genocide-affected areas to go abroad and 
did not return, the gap between post-war young and old cohorts would be reduced, biasing our DDD estimate toward 
zero.  
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---- Table 9 about here ---- 
 
(c) Selective killings  
de Walque & Verwimp (2009) demonstrate that the probability of being killed in the genocide 
was relatively higher for men, for the well-educated and for Tutsi, and was highest among the 
well-educated Tutsi male population. Figure 4 shows that Tutsi had on average more years of 
schooling than Hutu in 1991. Both the targeted killing of Tutsi adults and of other well-educated 
adults would thus bias downward our DD and DDD estimates, since it would reduce the gap 
between the schooling of the young and old age cohorts in the post-war population, and 
especially so in the provinces and communes with high genocide intensity. 
---- Figure 4 about here ---- 
As it has been estimated that approximately 75% of Tutsi were killed during the 
genocide, we gauge the magnitude of the bias by re-running our estimations after randomly 
removing 75% of Tutsi from the 1991 population, i.e. after artificially introducing in the 1991 
census a selection similar to the one caused by the genocide in 1994. This artificial manipulation 
of the sample, which results in the loss of around 3% of the observation, pushes the DDD 
coefficient down to -0.213, but leaves it statistically insignificant (Panel C of Table 9). 
Moreover, the large and significant coefficient of the two-way interaction term (young*post-war) 
remains, indicating that the localized effects of the genocide cannot fully account for the drop in 
schooling, even when controlling for the selective aspect of the killings.
30
  
                                                          
30 A stronger test would be to drop the 75% best educated Tutsi from the old age cohort, instead of a random 
sample. Doing so results in a negative and significant DDD coefficient of -0.836*** (not reported), indicating that 
the selective aspect of the killings has indeed the potential to mask the link between genocide intensity and the drop 
in schooling. However, it still cannot account for the large drop in schooling, because the DDD remains 
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(d) Post-war assistance to genocide survivors  
In the aftermath of conflict, many targeted assistance programs for genocide survivors were 
launched. For instance, the FARG (Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide) supports 
genocide survivors with allowances, health insurance, housing and school fees, among others. 
Table 10 – taken from the FARG website 31  - provides an overview of school fees paid 
throughout the years 1998 to 2010. In 1998, barely four years after the genocide, FARG was 
already awarding scholarships for secondary schooling to 24,000 students, which is a sizeable 
share of genocide survivors at schooling age.
32
 We lack detailed data on the other forms of 
support, but these figures are suggestive of the amount of resources mobilized to support 
genocide survivors.
33
  
---- Table 10 about here ---- 
The support received by genocide survivors may confound the link between the intensity 
of the genocide and the drop in schooling. Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence. Relying on 
data from a nationally representative survey collected in 1999/2000 (EICV1), it shows a 
markedly positive relationship between the share of students that report enjoying a scholarship in 
2000 and the province-level share of Tutsi in the pre-war population.
34
 The strong link between 
genocide and the scholarship program is also underscored by the fact that most of its 
beneficiaries (63%) are paternal orphans. The channeling of scholarships to genocide orphans 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quantitatively small (the average share of Tutsi in the sample is equal to 0.11) and, above all, because the large and 
significant coefficient of the two-way interaction term (young*post-war) remains virtually unaffected.  
31
 http://www.farg.gov.rw/ 
32
 It has been estimated that in total 300,000 Tutsi survived (Prunier, 1998) – among which about 20% would have 
been at secondary schooling age in 1998.  
33
 Although the scholarship program of the FARG targets secondary schooling, the foresight of access to secondary 
schooling may positively affect the decision to send children to primary school. Besides, primary schooling may be 
funded by the cash allowances, which amount to RWF 5000 monthly, and were received by about 30,000 people in 
2011. 
34
 The relationship holds for students in the age group 6-35, 6-15 and 16-35. 
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could account for a surprising finding in the census data, i.e. the small difference in schooling 
between orphans and non-orphans in provinces with a high share of Tutsi, while this difference is 
larger in provinces with low shares of Tutsi (see Figure A4 in Appendix).   
---- Figure 5 about here ---- 
But, is the scholarship program important enough to confound our DDD result? It can 
bias the DDD estimate to zero if it sufficiently drives up years of education for the young cohort. 
We cannot directly test this because the census data do not provide information on scholarships, 
but we can get an idea about the maximum possible bias induced by the scholarship program by 
removing from the young age cohort of each province a share of the best educated children, 
equal to the province-level share of children that received a scholarship according to the EICV1 
data. For instance, since 14% of students are reported to receive a scholarship in Gitarama 
province, compared to 5% in Gisenyi province, we drop from our sample 14% of the best 
educated children in the young cohort in Gitarama province and 5% in Gisenyi province. Doing 
so, we find that the DDD coefficient declines to -0.378, but remains statistically insignificant 
(Panel D of Table 9). We can therefore conclude that the potential bias induced by the program 
cannot account for the statistical mismatch between genocide intensity and drop in schooling.
35
 
 
8. The puzzle remains: what accounts for the large drop in schooling? 
When we account for potentially confounding factors, the DDD estimate changes, but remains 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the DD estimate remains remarkably stable across all the 
tests we performed. The puzzle thus remains: we cannot attribute the large drop in schooling to 
the localized effect of the genocide.  
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 Results are robust to dropping the share of the most educated individuals in the young cohort by commune rather 
than by province as well as to restricting the focus on paternal orphans.  
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We start this section by documenting this puzzle more carefully, by a spatial and a subsample 
analysis; then we investigate whether the drop in schooling may be unrelated to armed conflict 
and instead reflect a regional or national trend; or whether it is driven by other forms of violence 
that affected Rwanda in the nineties. After excluding these possibilities, we provide arguments in 
support of the conjecture that the impact of armed conflict in Rwanda was nationwide and thus 
not confined to the localized effects of the genocide.  
 
(a) The puzzle remains 
We visualize the subnational mismatch between the drop in schooling and genocide intensity  
by comparing the spatial pattern of the estimated drop in schooling with the spatial pattern of the 
pre-genocide share of Tutsi in the population. Figure 6a plots the quintiles of the commune-level 
DD estimates obtained by estimating Eq.(1) for each commune j separately, using the population 
census data. The spatial pattern shows clusters of large drops in schooling in the Northwest, 
scattered throughout the Centre, the South and East. The comparison of Figure 6a with Figure 
6b, which plots the share of Tutsi living in each commune in 1991, reveals a lack of 
correspondence between the distribution of the two variables. For instance, since the share of 
Tutsi in the northwestern provinces was as low as 1.5% (compared to over 10% in the South), it 
is unlikely that the large estimated drop in schooling in the Northwest is due to the genocide.  
---- Figure 6 about here ---- 
This is more rigorously shown by Figure 7, which plots the absolute value of the commune-
level DD estimates against the commune-level share of Tutsi in 1991. The relationship is 
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negative, indicating that the drop in schooling is on average smaller in communes with a high 
share of Tutsi.
36
  
---- Figure 7 about here ---- 
A further confirmation of the mismatch comes from the comparison of the estimated DD 
coefficient across two subsamples, one for provinces with over 5% Tutsi in their population prior 
to the genocide and one for the other provinces. The estimates are remarkably similar, at              
-0.641*** and -0.689***, respectively (not reported).  
If not the localized effects of genocide, what is  driving the drop in schooling? 
  
(b) A more general regional or national time trend 
Could it be that the drop in schooling picked up by the DD model is unrelated to genocide and is 
instead driven by a time trend? In order to test for this possibility AdW compare the trends in 
schooling in Rwanda in the nineties with those in neighboring countries (Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda). They demonstrate that years of schooling consistently increased for the Rwandan 
neighbors, indicating that the observed drop in Rwanda cannot be accounted for by regional 
events or regional time trends.  
Here, we perform another falsification test to verify whether a longstanding national time 
trend is driving our results. We estimate the DD model for two older cohorts of individuals, 
which were not exposed to armed conflict at schooling age, i.e. 31-50 and 51-70.
37
 The DD 
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 Because Tutsi were underreported in the population census, this pattern may be distorted. We therefore repeat the 
Figure for Gikongoro province only, using more reliable data on ethnicity coming from the local administration of 
the Province (see footnote 3). The pattern we find is again negative (not reported). 
37
 According to the 1991 population census, less than 1% of the individuals above 23 years were at school in 1991. 
We assume a similar distribution for 1994, and consider that individuals aged 23 in 1994 were 31 in 2002. The result 
is in any case very robust to changes in the age categories. 
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coefficient, is estimated at 0.148***, significant at 1% (not reported), indicating that, if anything, 
prior the genocide there was an upward national trend in schooling.  
 
(c) Other forms of violence 
The 1994 genocide was extremely violent (around 800.000 victims), but short-lived (around 100 
days). Other less intense, but longer-lasting forms of violence took place in Rwanda during the 
nineties, including civil war, revenge killings, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. 
Could it be that the drop in schooling picked up by the DD model is driven by these other 
events? To tentatively test this hypothesis, we rely on the scarcely available data that document 
other forms of violence in Rwanda.  
The first dataset is taken from Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) and contains an index that 
records excess mortality caused by episodes of violence different from the genocide. The index 
was generated by relying on the two population census rounds and on eleven excess mortality 
proxies.
38
 The second dataset contains the number of extrajudicial killings of civilians during the 
(counter)insurgency operations that took place till the late nineties in the Northwest of Rwanda. 
Data are collected from four Amnesty International Reports (Amnesty International, 1996, 
1997a, 1997b, 1998).
39
 While the first dataset has national coverage, the second dataset only 
contains information for the two provinces in the Northwest.  
Table 11 reports the results using these two alternative conflict proxies. The DDD estimates 
are negative, and in general statistically insignificant (for some age groups they turn 
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 See Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) for further details on the construction of this variable.  
39
 Verpoorten (2012) provides details on the compilation of this dataset. 
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significant).
40
 These results suggest that other forms of violence may partly account for the drop 
in schooling, but the fact that the DD coefficient remains negative, large and significant at 1%, 
indicates that the large drop in schooling remains unexplained, also by other forms of violence.  
 
(d) The cycle of violent events in the 1990s had above all a nationwide impact 
So far we have shown that Rwanda experienced a large drop in schooling during the violent 
decade of the nineties. We have excluded the possibility that this drop is part of a more general 
time trend. We have also excluded our first best guess, i.e. that the drop relates to the localized 
effects of the genocide. Finally, we have shown that the large drop can neither solely be 
attributed to the localized effects of other specific forms of violence that took place in the 
nineties.  
Putting these pieces of evidence together leads us to conjecture that the impact of the 
genocide on schooling was nationwide, because its disruptive effect was nationwide, or because 
it operated through national channels, or because genocide coincided with other forms of 
violence leaving no single area in Rwanda unaffected. Admittedly, this “residual” explanation is 
somewhat  ad hoc. We do however believe there is some basis for this conjecture.  
 First, a 1994 report from the Ministry of Education (MINEPRISEC/MINESUPRES, 
1994) indicates that the destruction of schools was widespread; 1186 out of 1836, or 65%, of the 
schools were reported to be damaged, needing urgent repair, while only 648 schools were fully 
operational. Moreover, most of the schools were reported to be looted and pillaged and 25% of 
them were still occupied by military forces or internally displaced people. Unfortunately, we do 
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 The coefficient of the Excess Mortality Index turns significant whenever considering the alternative age cohorts 8-
17 or 6-22. However, the DD coefficient remains negative, large and significant at 1%, thus confirming our 
conclusion. 
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not have detailed information on the actual location of the damaged schools. We can however 
derive information from a nationally representative community survey collected in 1999/2000 
(EICV1). The information on schools and schools built since 1994, reveals that communities 
more affected by the genocide were not less likely to be in the proximity of an operating primary 
school, and were not more likely to be the location of reconstruction or renovation works of a 
school building since 1994.
41
 This finding suggests that school buildings across the genocide-
affected and other communities were equally likely to have incurred damage. 
Second, besides school infrastructure, teachers had become a very scarce resource: many 
were killed, because they were Tutsi or part of the moderate Hutu elite; several others who were 
part of the Hutu elite had actively participated in the killings turning against fellow teachers, 
neighbors and pupils; and still others had moved abroad or to urban centers (Obura, 2003). The 
result was “the total erosion of faith in the education system”, with less than half of qualified 
teachers remaining in the primary system after the conclusion of the conflict (ibidem, p.48).
42
 
Third, the conflicts of the nineties heavily impacted the government budget, drying up 
resources for education. 
Fourth, many people, from all areas in Rwanda, fled the advancing RPF army fearing 
revenge actions against Hutu. They ended up in refugee camps abroad, or in camps within 
Rwanda located in a “safe zone” set up by the French intervention Opération Turquoise in the 
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 Results are based on regressions in which the dependent variable is the answer to one of the following questions: 
“is there a primary school in the village?”, “What is the distance to the closest primary school?” and “Is there a 
school built after the 4th of July 1994 in the cell?”. The regressors include one measure of genocide intensity (results 
are robust to using any measure) and province FE. Results are not reported, but  available on request. 
42
 When looking at the presence of teachers, relying on the sector of employment derived from the census data, we 
do find that communes more affected by the genocide had a significantly lower number of teachers (as a share of the 
active population) than less affected communes, after controlling for the share of teachers in 1991 levels. Although 
this may negatively affect the supply of schooling in the genocide-affected communes, the results of our paper show 
that it does not result in a larger drop in schooling in genocide-affected areas (section 7) and that it cannot account 
for the large drop in schooling in areas that were not affected by the genocide (section 8).  
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Southwestern part of Rwanda. The externally displaced, who were estimated at 2 million, or 
about 25% of the Rwandan population, only returned to Rwanda at a slow pace from 1996 
onwards (UNHCR, 2000). When Opération Turquoise ended on 22 August, some 390,000 out of 
the initial 1.5 million internally displaced remained in 33 camps. The forced closures of these 
remaining camps took place between August 1994 and April 1995 (Prunier, 1998). 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on refugee status to  test for this channel, but given the large 
numbers of people staying in camps for several months or even years, the refugee crisis in itself 
is likely to account for part of the drop in schooling.  
 
9. Conclusion 
By now, a large number of studies have documented the impact of armed conflict on schooling. 
Most studies rely on DHS data or other survey data that are representative at the national level. 
Our paper relied on two waves of population census data, which - compared to the DHS - have 
the advantages of being representative at the levels of small administrative units as well as 
subgroups of the population. 
Relying on these richer data, we replicated the main result reported in the widely cited 
study by Akresh and de Walque (2011). Our replication confirmed a drop in schooling of 
approximately 18% for children exposed to armed conflict in Rwanda. The estimated drop 
reached up to 25%, when older cut-off ages are used for the young age cohort, partly because 
there also was a sizable drop in secondary schooling.  
In order to shed more light on the causes of the observed drop, we provided novel 
evidence on the relative importance of school initiation, slow grade progression and dropouts, 
showing that the latter two account for the drop in primary schooling, while school initiation is 
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the main factor explaining the drop in secondary schooling. The finding that a sizeable share of 
the observed decline in primary schooling is driven by delays is hopeful, as it leaves room for 
rapid recovery. In terms of implications for future research, these findings suggest that empirical 
studies should give due attention to the time elapsed since the end of the conflict. It would for 
instance be possible to find a large negative impact of conflict on schooling in the early postwar 
years but no impact or even a positive impact further down the road.  
In their paper, AdW reported an additional negative effect of armed conflict on children 
from non-poor households (versus those from poor households) and on exposed boys (versus 
girls). When correcting their empirical specification by including all constitutive components of 
the interaction terms, our narrow replication resulted in a much smaller non-poor effect and did 
not yield any gender effect. Using a much larger sample, the broad replication yielded no 
conclusive results regarding the heterogeneous impact across poor and non-poor households and 
an additional – albeit small – negative effect for exposed girls.  
Also in contrast to AdW, we could not attribute the drop in schooling to the localized 
effects of the genocide, even when using data with complete geographic coverage and finer 
genocide intensity measures. It may seem counterintuitive that one of the largest mass killing of 
the 21
st
 century does not stand out in its effect on schooling. We ruled out that this 
counterintuitive result stems from pre-war regional trends, nonrandom displacement, selective 
killings, or targeted assistance to genocide survivors: correcting for these factors did not explain 
away the large drop in schooling, which is observed also in areas where no or very few Tutsi 
lived prior to the genocide.  
These results suggest that the impact of the genocide on the drop in schooling was 
nationwide; because it largely operated through national channels, or because the genocide 
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triggered other disruptive events which affected every corner of the country. By the time massive 
violence had stopped, the majority of school buildings were destroyed; the majority of teachers 
were displaced, killed or imprisoned; the government budget was virtually zero; and 30% of the 
population was internally or externally displaced, living in camps without proper access to 
schooling. Furthermore, other forms of violence, including civil war, revenge killings, 
insurgency and counter-insurgency, took place in the nineties, leaving no area of Rwanda 
violence-free. Combined, these events affected the entire country, and - although very different 
in nature compared to the genocide - these events may have been equally disruptive to schooling.  
This conclusion has relevant policy implications. Scholarships have been directed to 
genocide-affected areas and survivors of the genocide, being channeled through the various 
associations for survivors. Given the history of ethnic discrimination in Rwanda and its role in 
triggering and intensifying violence, such bias is not to be taken lightly. There is a danger that 
post-war reconstruction that is exclusively directed to genocide survivors and overlooks the 
needs of other victims might not only slow down the recovery of educational attainment, but may 
also reinforce group identities, potentially feeding ethnic grievances. 
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Figure 1. Years of schooling, across all ages of the age group 6-35
 
 
Figure 2. Years of schooling, across age and rural-urban 
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Figure 3. School initiation, drop-out or slow grade progression? 
(a) Share of individuals that have ever been to school, by age 
 
(b) Share of individuals that have completed primary school, among those that have ever attended it, but that are no 
longer enrolled in primary school, by age 
 
(c) Average age by grade, for student population only 
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Figure 4. Schooling across ethnicity in 1991 
 
Figure 5. The relationship between the pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi and the share of students 6-35 
enjoying a scholarship, as reported in a 1999/2000 nationwide survey 
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Figure 6. Comparison of the spatial pattern of DD estimates of the schooling deficit with the pre-genocide 
share of Tutsi in a commune 
(a) DD estimates, young age cohort: 6-15 (b) Pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi 
  
Top quintile (= largest schooling deficit or highest share of Tutsi) in darkest shade, calculated for each commune 
separately, using log(schooling) as a dependent variable to account for the different levels of schoolings between 
communes. The map is taken from a shape file of the Rwandan administrative sectors (which is one level below the 
communes, but for which no shape file exists). The areas in white are left out of the analysis. They include the 
national park, forest areas and lakes. 
 
Figure 7. The relationship between the pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi and the absolute values of the 
commune level difference-in-difference estimates of the drop in schooling 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
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Table 2. Narrow and Broad replication of basic result 
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Table 3. Alternative age cohorts and the impact on secondary schooling 
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Table 4. Poor versus non-poor 
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Table 5. Girls versus boys 
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Table 6. School initiation, slow grade progression and drop-outs 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Age
Students
Young Cohort: 6-15 14-22 10-18
Old Cohort: 16-35 23-35
Young Cohort * Post-war round -0.007 -0.285***
(0.009) (0.012)
Post-War Round 0.098*** 0.065*** 1.708***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.063)
Controls X Yes Yes Yes
Child Age FE Yes Yes No
Grade FE No No Yes
Administrative Unit FE Province Province Province
Observations 894,602 387,833 131,890
R-squared 0.256 0.249 0.314
Age
Students
Young Cohort: 14-22 18-26 18-26
Old Cohort: 23-35 27-35
Young Cohort * Post-war round -0.400*** 0.045***
(0.013) (0.009)
Post-War Round -0.014 0.066*** 0.209***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.065)
Controls X Yes Yes Yes
Child Age FE Yes Yes No
Grade FE No No Yes
Administrative Unit FE Province Province Province
Observations 210,842 72,179 16,252
R-squared 0.288 0.555 0.173
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. PANEL A: the sample
considered in the second column is restricted to individuals that have completed at least
one year of primary schooling, but that are not enrolled in primary school any more; the
sample considered in the third column for primary school is restricted to students
attending class 1 to 6. PANEL B: the sample considered in the first column is restricted to
individuals that have completed primary school; the sample considered in the second
column is restricted to individuals that have completed at least one year of secondary
schooling, but that are not enrolled in secondary school any more; the sample considered
in the third column is restricted to students attending class 7 to 12.
PRIMARY SCHOOLING, Dependent Variable:
Been to 
school
SECONDARY SCHOOLING, Dependent Variable:
Been to 
secondary
Completed 
primary
Completed 
secondary
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Table 7. Triple differenced regression with province-level conflict intensity measures 
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Table 8. Triple differenced regression with commune-level conflict intensity measures 
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Table 9. Confounding factors 
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Table 10. Schooling fees FARG 
 
  
Year Amount
Secondary University spent (RWF)
98-99 24 147 295 2 523 823 954
99-2000 26 474 978 2 082 207 374
2000-01 33 816 732 3 588 222 213
2001-02 33 929 1 275 4 333 510 776
2002-03 38 943 1 190 5 732 070 752
2003-04 43 952 1 081 3 776 603 240
2005 44 680 1 183 5 107 782 847
2006 47 371 1 317 7 090 147 893
2008 50 011 2 137 8 414 730 973
2009 52 737 3 844 9 558 351 570
2010 41 003 5 350 11 598 015 692
TOTAL 63 805 467 284
Number of beneficiaries
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Table 11. Other forms of violence 
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APPENDIX 
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Figure A1. DDD coefficient by age 
 
Notes: The figure shows the point estimates and the 95% CI for the DDD coefficients of the 
interaction terms obtained from a regression similar to the one reported in column (3) of Table 
4, in which the Young cohort has been replaced by the individual years, from 6 to 20 i.e. all the 
triple interactions female*postwarround*age6 etc are included, as well as all partial 
interactions.  
 
Figure A2. Regional trends in schooling in 1991 
 
Notes: The stronghold of Habyarimana includes the northwestern provinces Gisenyi and 
Gitarama. The stronghold of the Tutsi monarchy covers Butare and Gitarama. 
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Figure A3. Years of schooling, across age and migrants vs. non-migrants 
  
 
 
Figure A4. Years of schooling, across age, high or low share of Tutsi in 1991 and paternal orphans vs. others 
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Table A1. School initiation, slow grade progression and drop-outs – girls versus boys 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Age
Students
Young Cohort: 6-15 14-22 10-18
Old Cohort: 16-35 23-35
Young Cohort * Post-war round 0.013* -0.272***
(0.007) (0.012)
Post-War Round 0.070*** 0.063*** 1.747***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.069)
Female * (Young Cohort * Post-war round) -0.039*** -0.128***
(0.007) (0.011)
Female * Young Cohort 0.060*** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.005)
Female * Post-war round 0.055*** 0.003 -0.078***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.023)
Controls X Yes Yes Yes
Child Age FE Yes Yes No
Grade FE No No Yes
Administrative Unit FE Province Province Province
Observations 894,602 387,833 131,890
R-squared 0.256 0.250 0.314
Age
Students
Young Cohort: 14-22 18-26 18-26
Old Cohort: 23-35 27-35
Young Cohort * Post-war round -0.435*** 0.060***
(0.009) (0.011)
Post-War Round 0.021** 0.051*** 0.220**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.072)
Female * (Young Cohort * Post-war round) 0.078*** -0.034***
(0.015) (0.010)
Female * Young Cohort -0.083*** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.008)
Female * Post-war round -0.076*** 0.034* -0.027
(0.008) (0.019) (0.038)
Controls X Yes Yes Yes
Child Age FE Yes Yes No
Grade FE No No Yes
Administrative Unit FE Province Province Province
Observations 210,842 72,179 16,252
R-squared 0.289 0.555 0.173
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. PANEL A: the sample
considered in the second column is restricted to individuals that have completed at least
one year of primary schooling, but that are not enrolled in primary school any more; the
sample considered in the last column for primary school is restricted to students attending
class 1 to 6. PANEL B: the sample considered in the first column is restricted to individuals
that have completed primary school; the sample considered in the second column is
restricted to individuals that have completed at least one year of secondary schooling, but
that are not enrolled in secondary school any more; the sample considered in the last
column is restricted to students attending class 7 to 12.
SECONDARY SCHOOLING, Dependent Variable:
Been to 
secondary
PRIMARY SCHOOLING, Dependent Variable:
Been to 
school
Completed 
primary
Completed 
secondary
